Abstract. We use the indirect evolutionary approach to study evolutionarily stable preferences against multiple mutations in single-and multi-population settings, respectively. Each individual has subjective preferences over potential outcomes, and individuals are randomly matched to play an n-player strategic game. But their actual fitnesses are defined by material payoff functions. In the two population settings, respectively, we examine necessary and sufficient conditions for evolutionary stability against multiple mutations; we characterize the relations between the order of stability and the level of efficiency.
Introduction
The indirect evolutionary approach, pioneered by Güth and Yaari (1992) and Güth (1995) , is the standard model for studying the evolution of preferences. This approach has emerged to understand how behavior appears inconsistent with material self-interest, such as altruism, vengeance, punishment, fairness, and reciprocity, may be evolutionarily stable.
1 In this model, players are characterized by preferences rather than pre-programmed actions. Players choose strategies to maximize their subjective preferences, but receive the real fitnesses defined by material payoff functions. Eventually, evolutionary selection is driven by differences in average fitness values.
The concept of static stability in almost all literature regarding the indirect evolutionary approach is built on symmetric two-player games played by a single population of players without identifying their positions.
2 In addition, all these stability concepts require robustness against a single mutation. However, the assumption that there is at most one mutation arising in a population may not hold true for all environments. Furthermore, it may be the case that multiple mutations can destabilize a population, whereas a single mutation cannot destabilize it (see Examples 3.5 and 4.4). This paper, by contrast, considers the possibility that there are more than one new entrants entering a population simultaneously; we formalize evolutionary robustness against multiple mutations in single-and multi-population settings, respectively.
Throughout this paper, players are randomly drawn to play a strategic game in terms of their preferences, and we allow for all general preferences to compete in each population. As in a lot of the indirect evolutionary approach literature, the stability criterion we use is consistent with the concept of a neutrally stable strategy, which means that mutants may coexist with the incumbents in a stable 1 See, for example, Güth and Yaari (1992) , Güth (1995) , Bester and Güth (1998) , Huck and Oechssler (1999) , and Ostrom (2000) .
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Exceptions can be found: von Widekind (2008, p. 61) gives a definition of stability for two separate populations and develops an outlook with some illustrative examples; Tu and Juang (2018) study the evolution of general preferences in multiple populations under various degrees of observability.
environment, but they do not spread.
3 A natural question under this criterion is: what if there are more new mutations appearing in the post-entry environment? Can the original incumbents avoid being eliminated again?
4 Several mutations appearing simultaneously in a population can be considered not only as a small probability event, but also as a simple way of responding to this issue.
The key feature of the indirect evolutionary approach is that players can adjust their strategies according to their opponents if preferences are observable. It follows that an inefficient outcome can be destabilized by new entrants with appropriate preferences. Thus, every stable outcome is naturally endowed with some extra efficiency.
5 This also indicates that an individual having materialist preferences may have no evolutionary advantage.
In this paper, we introduce multiple mutations to characterize the relations between the order of stability and the level of efficiency in single-and multi-population settings, respectively. A common feature is that if the number of mutations is somehow increased enough, then the forms of efficiency will evolve toward the Pareto frontier of the cooperative payoff region. The reason for this phenomenon is that the increase in the number of mutant types will increase the number of types of correlated deviations, and it may bring more benefits to mutants. Of course, The concept of multi-mutation stability can be used to refine the evolutionarily stable outcomes.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we introduce basic notation and notions that will be used throughout the paper. In Section 3, we study evolutionarily stable preferences against multiple mutations in a single-population setting; we examine necessary and sufficient conditions for various orders of stability. Besides, in Section 4, we examine the above issues in a multi-population setting.
Basic Notation and Notions
The set of players {1, . . . , n} is denoted by N , and for each i ∈ N we let A i be a finite set of actions available to player i. For any finite set S, let ∆(S) denote the set of probability distributions over S. An element σ ∈ i∈N ∆(A i ) is known as a mixed strategy profile; a correlated strategy for n matched players is any element ϕ in ∆( i∈N A i ). Every mixed strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) can be interpreted as a correlated strategy ϕ σ in the following way: ϕ σ (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = i∈N σ i (a i ) for all (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ i∈N A i . We will call this correlated strategy the induced correlated strategy of σ. For each i ∈ N , let π i : i∈N A i → R be the material payoff function of player i. The function π i can be extended to the set i∈N ∆(A i ) as a multilinear function; it can also be extended to the set ∆( i∈N A i ) by taking expected values. Obviously, we have π i (σ) = π i (ϕ σ ) for all σ ∈ i∈N ∆(A i ), where ϕ σ is the induced correlated strategy of σ.
We interpret the value π i (a) as the reproductive fitness that player i obtains if an action profile a ∈ i∈N A i is played. The evolutionary success or failure of a preference type is determined by its average fitness. Combining all the n material payoff functions, we get the vector-valued material payoff function π : i∈N A i → R n that assigns to each action profile a the n-tuple (π 1 (a), . . . , π n (a)). This vectorvalued function π can be extended to the set i∈N ∆(A i ), or to the set ∆( i∈N A i ), through π 1 , . . . , π n .
3
The concept of a neutrally stable strategy was introduced by Maynard Smith (1982) .
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Regarding standard evolutionary game theoretic models, van Veelen (2012) studies the question of how a neutral mutant affects a neutrally stable strategy.
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When preferences are observable, the tendency towards efficiency is a general property of models based on the indirect evolutionary approach; see also Dekel et al. (2007 ), von Widekind (2008 , and Tu and Juang (2018) .
Let Θ be the set of all von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions over i∈N A i . For i ∈ N , a utility function θ i ∈ Θ, referred to as a preference type, is identified with a group of individuals in the i-th population who have such preferences and make the same decisions. A preference type is said to be indifferent if it is represented in terms of a constant utility function The preferences of individuals may not be represented by their respective material payoff functions; individuals in the same population may differ in their preference rankings of the potential outcomes. Specifically, if two players have the same preference relation but choose distinct strategies, their preferences can be represented here by two different utility functions congruent modulo a positive affine transformation. We assume that the number of preference types present in each population is finite, and the number of individuals corresponding to each present type is infinite. Then a probability distribution on Θ, representing the distribution of preferences in one population, must have finite support.
Suppose that preferences are fully observable, and that individuals are drawn independently to play an n-player strategic game in terms of their preferences, which describes the strategic interactions among the matched individuals. Then fitness values are assigned to strategies according to the material payoff function. We can imagine that such a game is repeated infinitely many times, and one of the Nash equilibria is played in each of the resulting games. So the average fitness to each individual can be determined, and the principle of survival of the fittest suggests that a preference type can prevail only if the type receives the highest average fitness in its population.
The objective of this paper is to study the evolution of preferences without any restriction on the number of mutations in each population. We will formalize robustness against multiple mutations in two cases: one is the case where there is only one population and all n players are randomly drawn from the population; the other is the case where there are n separate populations and one player is randomly drawn from each of the n populations. To investigate the effects of multiple mutations on populations, the concepts of multi-mutation stability in our single-and multi-population settings are consistent with those used in Dekel et al. (2007) and Tu and Juang (2018) , respectively.
Our criteria should satisfy two requirements: if the population shares of mutants are small enough, the behavioral outcomes are almost unchanged, and no incumbent will be driven out. For a mutation set, we consider that it fails to invade if one of the mutant types in some population will become extinct, as suggested by Tu and Juang (2018) . The reason for this is that interactions among mutants of a mutation set may look as if they cooperate with one another such that some of the mutants have fitness advantages over the incumbents at the expense of the other mutants. Such fitness advantages will disappear when the latter go extinct. Rather than examining the emergence of one particular preference type, we are interested in the evolutionarily viable outcome. We will give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of stable outcomes in the single-and multi-population settings, respectively.
The Single-population Case
In this section, let individuals in each match be drawn randomly from a single infinite population. Suppose that players cannot identify their positions in the resulting game they play, and that the fitness values assigned to the adopted equilibrium depend only on the strategies being played, not on who play them. The material payoff function and players' preferences are presented below.
For ease of presentation, only two-player games will be considered in the singlepopulation case. Under the above assumptions, the game ({1, 2}, (A i ), (π i )) that is used for the fitness assignment is a symmetric game, that is, A 1 = A 2 and π 2 (a, a ′ ) = π 1 (a ′ , a) for any strategies a and a ′ . We will write S for the common set of pure strategies available to players in any position. For a preference type θ ∈ Θ, the expected subjective utility to its strategy σ, when played against some strategy σ ′ , is denoted by θ(σ, σ ′ ), where σ, σ ′ ∈ ∆(S). Let M(Θ) be the set of all probability distributions on Θ having finite supports.
Assume that individuals for each match are drawn independently according to µ ∈ M(Θ), which represents the distribution of preference types in the population. Interactions between any two players in supp(µ), the support of µ, are characterized by the two-player game Γ(µ). Combining this with the symmetric game ({1, 2}, S, (π i )), the pair [({1, 2}, S, (π i )), Γ(µ)] is referred to as an environment. A strategy for a preference type θ ∈ supp(µ) is a function b θ : supp(µ) → ∆(S); players of the type θ would choose the strategy b θ (θ ′ ) when playing against the type
We say b is an equilibrium in the game Γ(µ) if for any θ, θ ′ ∈ supp(µ),
Let B(supp(µ)) denote the set of all such equilibria in Γ(µ).
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For a preference distribution µ ∈ M(Θ) and an equilibrium b ∈ B(supp(µ)), the pair (µ, b) is called a configuration. By the law of large numbers, the average fitness of a preference type θ ∈ supp(µ) with respect to (µ, b) is given by
We define the aggregate outcome of (µ, b) to be the correlated strategy ϕ µ,b satisfying
holds for any a, a ′ ∈ S, which means that the aggregate outcome is a symmetric correlated strategy, so π 1 (ϕ µ,b ) = π 2 (ϕ µ,b ). In particular, a symmetric strategy profile (σ, σ) ∈ ∆(S) 2 is called an aggregate outcome if the induced correlated strategy ϕ σ is the aggregate outcome of some configuration, where ϕ σ is defined by ϕ σ (a, a ′ ) = σ(a)σ(a ′ ) for all (a, a ′ ) ∈ S 2 . Let µ ∈ M(Θ) be the incumbent preference distribution. Suppose that there are distinct mutations θ 1 , . . . , θ r introduced into the population simultaneously with population shares ε 1 , . . . , ε r , respectively. In this paper, we allow for all possible types of mutants to compete, except that they must be distinguishable from the incumbents, that is, θ s / ∈ supp(µ) for all s. The set { θ 1 , . . . , θ r }, called an r-th order mutation set, is denoted by Θ(r), and the multiset {ε 1 , . . . , ε r } is denoted by E(r). We will use the notation E(r) 1 for the sum ε 1 + · · · + ε r . The post-entry distribution of preferences can be characterized by
In a symmetric game ({1, 2}, S, (π i )), the notation ∆(S) 2 means ∆(S)×∆(S), and the notation ∆(S 2 ) will be used for ∆(S × S). 7 The set B(supp(µ)) is nonempty, because not only does a mixed Nash equilibrium always exist, but we can also find a symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium in any finite symmetric game. where δ θ s is the degenerate distribution concentrated at θ s for s = 1, . . . , r, and its support, supp( µ E(r) ), is supp(µ) ∪ Θ(r). For notational convenience, we shall often abbreviate Θ(r), E(r), and µ E(r) to Θ, E, and µ E , respectively. Since preference evolution is driven by differences in fitness values, it is necessary to assume that incumbents receive the same average fitness for a configuration to be stable.
To satisfy the condition that mutants cannot significantly affect the aggregate outcome if they are rare enough, we demand that the strategic interactions between incumbents will remain unchanged when they are matched again in the post-entry environment.
, and let a mutation set Θ(r) be given with E(r).
Remark. Note that the focal set B(supp( µ E ); b) is nonempty, and that it is independent of E(r). In addition, the desired property that
The criterion for multi-mutation stability of a configuration defined in the singlepopulation case is formulated as follows.
Definition 3.3. In [({1, 2}, S, (π i )), Γ(µ)], a configuration (µ, b) is said to be multimutation stable of order r, or r-th order stable, if it is balanced, and if for any Θ(r) ⊂ Θ \ supp(µ) and any b ∈ B(supp( µ E ); b), there exists someε ∈ (0, 1) such that for every E(r) with E(r) 1 ∈ (0,ε), either (i) or (ii) is satisfied.
r) and for every θ ∈ supp(µ).
(
If (µ, b) is stable of order 1, it is usually simply said to be stable. If (µ, b) is stable of all orders, it is said to be infinitely stable. We call a symmetric strategy profile (σ, σ) ∈ ∆(S) 2 multi-mutation stable of order r, or r-th order stable, if it is the aggregate outcome of an r-th order stable configuration.
Remark. There is a noteworthy difference between the stability concepts defined here and in Dekel et al. (2007) . The statement of the stability condition used in Dekel et al. (2007) contains the possibility that there are both a mutant type and an incumbent type who have the lowest average fitness, but at the same time there is another incumbent type who has a higher average fitness.
8 In this paper, our definition directly excludes this possibility.
It is easy to see that a configuration must be kept multi-mutation stable of lower orders if it is a stable configuration of order greater than 1.
Lemma 3.4. Let (µ, b) be an l-th order stable configuration with l > 1. Then it is stable of order r for any r < l.
Proof. Suppose that a balanced configuration (µ, b) is not stable of order r. This means that there exist a mutation set Θ(r) and an equilibrium b ∈ B(supp( µ E ); b)
such that for arbitrarily givenε ∈ (0, 1), we can choose E(r) with E(r) 1 ∈ (0,ε) for which the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) for every θ s ∈ Θ(r), there is θ ∈ supp(µ) with
holds for some θ, θ ∈ supp( µ E ). Let l be a positive integer with l > r. To prove that the configuration (µ, b) is not l-th order stable, we consider a new mutation set
. . , r − 1 and ε ′r + ε ′r+1 + · · · + ε ′l = ε r . Suppose that the preferences of each of the mutant types θ r+1 , . . . , θ l are such that their strategic behavior is the same as that of the mutant type θ r . Then there is an equilibrium b ′ ∈ B(supp( µ E ; b) = 1 and Π θ i ( µ E ; b) = 1 + ε j for all i, where j = i. This shows that (µ, b) is not a second order stable configuration. Furthermore, Theorem 3.16 will guarantee that ((0.5, 0.5), (0.5, 0.5)) is the unique stable strategy profile, and that there exists no strategy profile which is stable of order greater than 1 in this game.
Remark. Because mutants entering the population can have any preference type, technically indifferent types are used instead of potential entrants that are well adapted to the environments.
In symmetric games, a specific type of efficiency focusing on symmetric strategy profiles is frequently used.
Definition 3.6. In a symmetric game ({1, 2}, S, (π i )), a strategy σ * ∈ ∆(S) (or a strategy profile (σ
Obviously, the efficient fitness π 1 (σ * , σ * ) is uniquely determined, but an efficient strategy may not be unique. Except for efficiency of a symmetric strategy profile, here the concept of Pareto efficiency is needed to characterize the features of multimutation stability.
Definition 3.7. For a nonempty subset C of R n , the Pareto frontier of C is defined as
We will focus attention on the Pareto frontiers of the noncooperative payoff region and the cooperative payoff region induced by the material payoff function.
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Remark. In a symmetric two-player game, a strategyσ ∈ ∆(S) satisfying π(σ,σ) ∈ P (π(∆(S)
2 )) must be efficient, but not vice versa as Example 3.5 shows.
Before we derive the necessary conditions for configurations to be multi-mutation stable, we first introduce two useful lemmas.
holds for every θ ∈ supp(µ).
Proof. Suppose that there exist distinct types θ ′ , θ ′′ ∈ supp(µ) such that
for someθ ∈ supp(µ). Introduce a mutant type θ into the population with a population share ε. Suppose that the post-entry equilibrium b chosen from B(supp( µ
Thus the inequality
eventually holds whenever ε is sufficiently small, and so (µ, b) is not a stable configuration.
Proof. Suppose that there existsθ ∈ supp(µ) such that b(θ,θ) is not efficient. Consider an entrant θ with a population share ε. Let σ * ∈ ∆(S) be efficient, and suppose that the chosen equilibrium b ∈ B(supp( µ
for any ε ∈ (0, 1), and thus the configuration (µ, b) is not stable.
9 For a two-player game ({1, 2}, S, (π i )), the noncooperative payoff region and the cooperative payoff region refer to the plane regions π(∆(S) 2 ) and π(∆(S 2 )), respectively. Dekel et al. (2007) show that a stable outcome must be efficient when preferences are observable. In this paper, we demonstrate that there is a tendency for efficiency levels to increase with higher orders of stability. If the efficiency level of an outcome is not high enough, there are different types of mutants that can destabilize the configuration together based on their own preferences as follows. Mutants of any type would maintain some pre-entry outcomes when matched against themselves or against the incumbents, and would achieve more efficient outcomes when matched against the other mutant types.
. Then by Lemma 3.8, we have
for every i ∈ {1, 2} and
and for all θ ∈ supp(µ). For each i ∈ {1, 2}, the difference between the average fitnesses of θ i andθ i can be written as
where j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i}, and hence
is not a second order stable configuration.
For (iii), we argue by contradiction. Let the configuration (µ, b) be stable of order 3 in [({1, 2}, S, (π i )), Γ(µ)], and suppose that there existθ
. By Lemma 3.4 and property (i), the equality π b(θ 1 ,θ 2 ) = π(σ * , σ * ) is true, and thus π(σ
Suppose that the equilibrium b ∈ B(supp( µ E ); b) satisfies the following conditions. When two distinct types of mutants are matched,
Otherwise, for a given θ s ∈ Θ and for any θ ∈ supp(µ), we have
Then the difference between the average fitnesses of θ s ∈ Θ and θ ∈ supp(µ) is
for any ε ∈ (0, 1), and thus we have arrived at a contradiction.
Remark. Furthermore, Lemma 3.4 implies that if (µ, b) is stable of order 2 then
When a configuration is stable, it is clear that the average fitness of every incumbent must be efficient, since all incumbents receive the efficient fitness in each of their interactions, as described in part (i) of Theorem 3.10. Besides, the aggregate outcome of a stable configuration also corresponds to the efficient fitness value.
Corollary 3.11. Let (µ, b) be a stable configuration in [({1, 2}, S, (π i )), Γ(µ)] with the aggregate outcome ϕ µ,b , and let σ * be an efficient strategy in ({1, 2}, S, (π i )). Then the relations
hold for every θ ∈ supp(µ).
Proof. Let (µ, b) be a stable configuration. Then we have
by part (i) of Theorem 3.10.
In Example 3.5, the stable configuration can be invaded and displaced by a mutation set of two types of mutants. In fact, mutants' invasion capacity cannot unrestrictedly expand with the new types entering the population. We show here that a third order stable configuration in a two-player environment will also be stable of all orders.
Theorem 3.12. In [({1, 2}, S, (π i )), Γ(µ)], a configuration (µ, b) is infinitely stable if and only if it is stable of order 3.
Proof. One direction follows immediately from Lemma 3.4: an infinitely stable configuration must be stable of order 3. For the converse, suppose that (µ, b) is a third order stable configuration in [({1, 2}, S, (π i )), Γ(µ)]. Then, by the remark after Theorem 3.10, we have π b(θ, θ
, where σ * ∈ ∆(S) is an efficient strategy. Let r ∈ Z + , and let Θ = { θ 1 , . . . , θ r } be introduced into the population with E = {ε 1 , . . . , ε r }. For any given θ ∈ supp(µ), θ s ∈ Θ, and for arbitrarily chosen b ∈ B(supp( µ E ); b), the difference between their average fitnesses
We see first that π 1 (σ
, since otherwise, as in the proof of Lemma 3.8, the post-entry average fitness of each incumbent will be strictly less than the average fitness of some sufficiently rare mutant type that invades the population alone with suitable strategies, a contradiction. Moreover, if there existsθ ∈ supp(µ) such that π 1 (σ * , σ
for all θ ∈ supp(µ) whenever E 1 is small enough, which means that the mutation set Θ would fail to invade. We therefore assume from now on that
, then the assumption that
implies that there is a mutant type that can invade the population alone to earn a strictly higher average fitness than the incumbent typeθ, a contradiction. Therefore, for any given θ s ∈ Θ, we let π 2 b( θ s , θ) = π 2 (σ * , σ * ) for every θ ∈ supp(µ). Then the difference between the average fitnesses of any θ ∈ supp(µ) and any θ s ∈ Θ can be written as
Finally, we observe that
. From this inequality, it follows that
s ∈ Θ and all θ ∈ supp(µ), no matter what E is. This completes the proof.
We now turn our attention to sufficient conditions for stability. We will show that a symmetric strict Nash equilibrium could form a stable aggregate outcome against multiple mutations depending on its efficiency level. To see this, let a monomorphic population consist of incumbents for which the symmetric strict Nash equilibrium strategy is strictly dominant, and consider any mutation set. Then a mutant type with a small population share will be driven out if the mutants choose any other strategy when matched against the incumbents. Furthermore, a high enough level of efficiency would imply that no matter how complicated the mutants interact, none of them can earn a higher average fitness without any expense to themselves. Theorem 3.13. Let (a * , a * ) be a strict Nash equilibrium of ({1, 2}, S, (π i )).
Proof. Suppose that (a * , a * ) is a strict Nash equilibrium of ({1, 2}, S, (π i )). Let (µ, b) be a configuration where the population consists of θ * for which a * is the strictly dominant strategy. Let r be a positive integer, and consider a mutation set Θ = { θ 1 , . . . , θ r } with E = {ε 1 , . . . , ε r }. For any θ s ∈ Θ and any b ∈ B(supp( µ
Because (a * , a * ) is a strict Nash equilibrium, we assume that b θ s (θ * ) = a * for all
sufficiently small, and so the mutation set Θ fails to invade. Then the above fitness difference can be reduced to
Part (i) follows directly from the condition that (a * , a * ) is an efficient strategy profile. For (ii), let π(a * , a * ) ∈ P (π(∆(S) 2 )), and suppose that there are two distinct types of mutants in Θ. Then (a * , a * ) is efficient, and it follows that for each i ∈ {1, 2}, the difference between the average fitnesses of θ * and θ i satisfies
where j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i}. Since π(a * , a * ) ∈ P (π(∆(S) 2 )), we obtain that for arbitrary
For part (iii), let π(a * , a * ) ∈ P (π(∆(S 2 ))), and let r be any positive integer. As in the proof of Theorem 3.12, the condition π(a * , a
independently of E, and the proof is finished.
Example 3.14. Let the fitness assignment be characterized by the following symmetric two-player game G. The set of actions available to each player is S = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }, and the material payoff function is denoted by π.
a 1 a 2 a 3 a 1 3, 3 0, 0 0, 0 a 2 0, 0 0, 0 9, 2 a 3 0, 0 2, 9 0, 0 We see that (a 1 , a 1 ) is a strict Nash equilibrium of G, and π(a 1 , a 1 ) ∈ P (π(∆ (S) 2 )). Therefore, by part (ii) of Theorem 3.13, (a 1 , a 1 ) is a second order stable aggregate outcome. However, since π(a 1 , a 1 ) / ∈ P (π(∆(S 2 ))), Lemma 3.4 and part (iii) of Theorem 3.10 imply that (a * , a * ) is not multi-mutation stable of order greater than or equal to 3. In addition, note that if σ, σ ′ ∈ ∆(S) satisfy π(σ, σ ′ ) = π(a 1 , a 1 ), then (σ, σ ′ ) = (a 1 , a 1 ). So, by part (i) of Theorem 3.10, there exists no other stable strategy profile in G.
Finally, we give a characterization of multi-mutation stable outcomes for the class of symmetric 2 × 2 games. It turns out that in symmetric 2 × 2 games, a symmetric strategy profile is infinitely stable if and only if it consists of a pure efficient strategy.
10 Moreover, games only with a mixed efficient strategy do not have infinitely stable aggregate outcomes.
Let the fitness assignment be represented by the following symmetric 2 × 2 game. Without loss of generality, assume that A ≥ D.
We shall need the following lemma, and it can be shown by a direct calculation. (i) If (a 1 , a 1 ) is efficient, then it is infinitely stable.
(ii) If (a 1 , a 1 ) is not efficient, then the efficient strategy profile (σ * , σ * ) is stable if and only if B = C > A. In this case, there exists no strategy profile that is stable of order greater than 1.
Proof. For (i), let (a 1 , a 1 ) be efficient. Then, by Lemma 3.15, we must have 2A ≥ B + C and hence π(a 1 , a 1 ) ∈ P (π(∆(S 2 ))). Moreover, if A > C, then (a 1 , a 1 ) is a strict Nash equilibrium. According to Theorem 3.13, we know that (a 1 , a 1 ) is infinitely stable. Next we show that if A ≤ C, there also exists an infinitely stable configuration with the aggregate outcome (a 1 , a 1 ).
Let (µ, b) be a monomorphic configuration for which the unique preference type θ in supp µ satisfies θ(a i , a j ) = 1 if (a i , a j ) = (a 2 , a 2 ) and θ(a i , a j ) = 0 otherwise, and b θ (θ) = a 1 . Let r ∈ Z + , and let Θ = { θ 1 , . . . , θ r } be introduced into the population with E = {ε 1 , . . . , ε r }. For b ∈ B(supp( µ E ); b), the post-entry average fitnesses of the incumbent type θ and any mutant type θ s are, respectively,
Suppose that A > D, and let
we assume that b θ s (θ) = a 1 for every θ s ∈ Θ, and so Π θ ( µ E ; b) = A. Therefore,
Case 2: B < A ≤ C. Let b θ s (θ) = (p s , 1−p s ) for s = 1, . . . , r. If p s ∈ (0, 1) for some s, then b θ ( θ s ) = a 2 and we have Π θ ( µ E ; b) > Π θ s ( µ E ; b) as long as E 1 is small 10 Dekel et al. (2007) show that efficiency of a pure strategy is sufficient for the corresponding outcome to be stable in 2 × 2 games. Here, we further show that it is also sufficient for infinite stability.
enough. Therefore, for a given mutant type θ s , we assume that b θ s (θ) = a 1 or a 2 .
When b θ s (θ) = a 1 , the incumbent type is indifferent between a 1 and a 2 . However, we will let b θ ( θ s ) = a 1 , since otherwise we can conclude that
For a given θ s , if b θ s (θ) = a 2 , then b θ ( θ s ) = a 2 , and hence
enough. The only thing remaining in the case A > D is to assume that b θ t (θ) = a 1 for all θ t ∈ Θ. Under our previous assumption that
follows that for any θ s ∈ Θ, the difference between the average fitnesses of θ and θ s is
As in the proof of Theorem 3.12, the condition π(a 1 , a 1 )
Then, since we assume that b θ ( θ t ) = a 1 whenever b θ t (θ) = a 1 , it holds that π b( θ t , θ) = (A, A) for any θ t ∈ Θ, no matter what strategy the mutant type θ t chooses from a 1 and a 2 . Again, we obtain equation (3.1), and so we can conclude that the mutation set Θ fails to invade, or the incumbents can coexist with the mutants. This completes the proof of part (i).
To prove part (ii), suppose that (a 1 , a 1 ) is not efficient. Then, by Lemma 3.15, the inequality 2A < B + C holds and the efficient strategy σ * is such that σ * (a 1 ) =
B+C−2D
2(B+C−A−D) , which will be denoted by α * . Let (µ, b) be a stable configuration with the aggregate outcome (σ * , σ * ). Since the efficient strategy here is unique, according to part (i) of Theorem 3.10, b θ (θ) = σ * for every θ ∈ supp(µ). Consider an indifferent mutant type θ entering the population with the population share ε. For any b ∈ B(supp( µ E ); b), the average fitness of θ is
Since (µ, b) is stable, the post-entry average fitness of any incumbent θ ∈ supp(µ) can be written as
Suppose that b θ (θ) = σ * for all θ ∈ supp(µ). Then each incumbent will be indifferent between a 1 and a 2 , and we suppose that the equation b θ ( θ) = (q, 1 − q) holds for all θ ∈ supp(µ), where q ∈ [0, 1]. Under these assumptions, we have
Note that for any given q ∈ [0, 1], the stability of (µ, b) requires that π 1 (σ * , σ * ) ≥ θ∈supp(µ) µ(θ)π 1 b( θ, θ) . If q = 0, this condition induces that C ≥ B; if q = 1, this condition induces that B ≥ C. Therefore, the efficient strategy profile (σ * , σ * ) being stable implies that B = C > A.
Conversely, suppose that B = C > A. Define a preference type θ * by θ * (a 1 , a 1 ) = 1 − α * , θ * (a 2 , a 2 ) = α * , and θ * (a i , a j ) = 0 whenever a i = a j . Let (µ, b) be a monomorphic configuration, where the population consists of θ * for which b θ * (θ * ) = σ * . Consider a mutant type θ entering the population with the population share ε. Let some b ∈ B(supp( µ E ); b) be given, and suppose that b θ (θ * ) = (p, 1 − p). Then 
If p > α * , then, by applying B = C > A, we have
Similarly, when p < α * , we also have
as long as ε is small enough. Finally, let p = α * . Then, by B = C, it can be shown that
no matter what strategy the incumbent type θ * chooses. Clearly, the efficiency property of (σ
is a stable aggregate outcome. In addition, we see that when (a 1 , a 1 ) is not efficient, the unique stable strategy profile (σ * , σ * ) has the property that π(σ * , σ * ) / ∈ P (π(∆(S) 2 )). Therefore, by Lemma 3.4 and part (ii) of Theorem 3.10, there exists no strategy profile that is stable of order greater than 1 in this case.
The Multi-population Case
In this section, we study evolutionarily stable preferences against multiple mutations in multiple populations. Suppose that there are n separate populations consisting of an infinite number of individuals. In every match, n players are drawn independently, one at random from each population, to play the game. Denote by M(Θ n ) the set of all joint distributions of n independent random variables defined on the same sample space Θ with finite support. Let µ ∈ M(Θ n ). Then the support of µ can be written as supp(µ) = i∈N supp(µ i ), where µ i is the preference distribution over all types of players in the i-th population.
For a given µ ∈ M(Θ n ), interactions among any n players in supp(µ) are characterized by the n-player game Γ(µ), and the pair [(N, (A i ), (π i )), Γ(µ)] is referred to as an environment. Note that the game (N, (A i ), (π i )) can be symmetric or asymmetric. A strategy adopted by a player i is a function
We say b an equilibrium in the game Γ(µ) if for any θ ∈ supp(µ), the strategy profile b(θ) is a Nash equilibrium of the resulting strategic game played by θ, that is, for each i ∈ N ,
We denote by B(supp(µ)) the set of all such equilibria in Γ(µ).
For µ ∈ M(Θ n ) and b ∈ B(supp(µ)), the pair (µ, b) is called a configuration, and the aggregate outcome of (µ, b) is the correlated strategy ϕ µ,b satisfying
for every (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A, where b i (θ)(a i ) denotes the probability that b i (θ) assigns to a i . A strategy profile σ ∈ i∈N ∆(A i ) is called an aggregate outcome if the induced correlated strategy ϕ σ is the aggregate outcome of some configuration. For i ∈ N , the average fitness of a type θ i ∈ supp(µ i ) with respect to (µ, b) is given by
where µ −i (θ ′ −i ) and supp(µ −i ) denote µ(θ ′ −i |θ i ) and j =i supp(µ j ), respectively. As in Section 3, a configuration (µ, b) is said to be balanced if for each i ∈ N , the equality
is the joint preference distribution over all incumbent types in all n populations. Let J = {i 1 , . . . , i k } be any nonempty subset of N . For every j ∈ J, suppose that there are m j distinct mutations θ by E j 1 , and define E(m J ) ∞ = max j∈J E j 1 . Then, after an entry, the post-entry distribution of preferences in each i-th population is represented by
is the degenerate distribution concentrated at θ s i for s = 1, . . . , m i . Again, the notations Θ, E, and µ E may be used in place of Θ(m J ), E(m J ), and µ E(mJ ) , respectively.
Next, we extend the definitions of a focal equilibrium and of stability to the multi-population setting. 
be the set of all focal equilibria relative to b in Γ( µ E ), called a focal set.
11
As in the single-population setting, we allow for all preferences satisfying the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms to evolve in each population. All mutants need to be distinguishable from the incumbents. In particular, if different individuals have the same preference relation, then their preferences can be represented by different utility functions congruent modulo a positive affine transformation.
is said to be multimutation stable of order m, or m-th order stable, if it is balanced, and if for any Θ(m J ) with m J ∞ = m and for any b ∈ B(supp( µ E ); b), there is someε ∈ (0, 1) such that for every E(m J ) with E(m J ) ∞ ∈ (0,ε), either (i) or (ii) is satisfied.
11 In the multi-population setting, the focal set is always nonempty, and the post-entry aggregate outcome can be made arbitrarily close to the pre-entry one, as described in the remark of Definition 3.2.
If (µ, b) is stable of order 1, it is said simply to be stable. If (µ, b) is stable of all orders, it is said to be infinitely stable. We call a strategy profile σ ∈ i∈N ∆(A i ) multi-mutation stable of order m, or m-th order stable, if it is the aggregate outcome of an m-th order stable configuration.
Unsurprisingly, a multi-mutation stable configuration can be held stable of lower orders in the multi-population setting. The proof is just like the proof of Lemma 3.4 with additional populations.
Lemma 4.3. If a configuration (µ, b) is stable of order l with l > 1, then it is stable of order r for any r < l.
The converse of Lemma 4.3 is not a true statement, as the next example shows.
Example 4.4. Suppose that the fitness assignment is represented by the following two-player game G with the material payoff function π. The set of actions available to each player i is A i = {a i1 , a i2 , a i3 }.
a 21 a 22 a 23 a 11 7, 7 0, 0 0, 0 a 12 0, 0 9, 6 0, 0 a 13 0, 0 0, 0 6, 9
We claim that (a 11 , a 21 ) is stable of order 1, but not of order 2. It is easy to check that (a 11 , a 21 ) is a strict Nash equilibrium of G, and the payoff profile π(a 11 , a 21 ) is actually on the Pareto frontier of π ∆(A 1 ) × ∆(A 2 ) . Suppose that a i1 is the strictly dominant strategy for the incumbents in each i-th population. Then any mutant type with a sufficiently small population share will be driven out if the mutants choose any other strategy when matched against the incumbents. When two mutants from different populations are matched, Pareto efficiency implies that the fitness of one mutant cannot be improved without the worsening of the other mutant's fitness. Thus, the strategy profile (a 11 , a 21 ) is a stable aggregate outcome; see also Theorem 4.7.
To see that (a 11 , a 21 ) is not stable of order 2, let (µ, b) be a configuration with the aggregate outcome (a 11 , a 21 ). Then b(θ) = (a 11 , a 21 ) for all θ ∈ supp(µ). For every i ∈ {1, 2}, consider the mutant types θ 2 ) = (a 12 , a 22 ). Let ε s i = ε ∈ (0, 1) for all i, s ∈ {1, 2}. Then for each i ∈ {1, 2}, the post-entry average fitness of any incumbent θ i is Π θi ( µ E ; b) = 7. On the other hand, for s ∈ {1, 2}, the average fitness of the mutant type θ
no matter what ε is, that is, the strategy profile (a 11 , a 21 ) is not stable of order 2.
To examine the features of multi-population stability, we need the concept of Pareto efficiency defined in payoff regions. To simplify notation, we will write the two payoff regions as S nc and S co instead of as π i∈N ∆(A i ) and π ∆( i∈N A i ) , respectively.
12 Then, certainly, S nc ⊆ S co . It is clear that the set S co is the convex hull of the set π( i∈N A i ) of pure-payoff profiles. Let S Q co be the set of convex combinations of payoff points in π( i∈N A i ) with rational coefficients. Then S Q co is dense in S co . Similarly, we denote by S Q nc the set of payoff profiles achievable with rational mixed-strategy profiles.
13 Then S Q nc ⊆ S Q co , and S Q nc is dense in S nc . For a stable configuration in the multi-population model with complete information, Tu and Juang (2018) reveal that the payoff profile of an equilibrium outcome adopted by any n matched incumbents must be on the Pareto frontier of the noncooperative payoff region; moreover, the form of Pareto efficiency is unique to a given stable configuration, as presented in Proposition 4.5.
14 Here, we further show that a sufficiently high-order stable configuration can be such that all adopted strategy profiles will correspond to the same payoff vector located on the Pareto frontier of the cooperative payoff region. 
hold for any θ ∈ supp(µ) and anyθ i ∈ supp(µ i ).
Let z = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) and x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) be two n-tuples. For any subset T ⊆ N , it is convenient to write (z T , x −T ) for the new n-tuple defined as (z
Proof. To prove (i), suppose that there isθ ∈ supp(µ) with π b(θ) / ∈ P (S nc ). Then there exists σ ∈ i∈N ∆(A i ) such that π i (σ) ≥ π i b(θ) for all i ∈ N and π k (σ) > π k b(θ) for some k ∈ N . For each i-th population, consider an indifferent mutant type θ i entering the population. Let b ∈ B(supp( µ E ); b) satisfy (1) b( θ) = σ; (2) for any T N and any θ −T ∈ supp(µ −T ), we have b( θ T , θ −T ) = b(θ T , θ −T ). Then, for each i ∈ N , the difference between the average fitnesses of θ i andθ i is For part (ii), suppose that there isθ ∈ supp(µ) with π b(θ) ∈ S Q nc \ P (S Q co ). Then we can choose a payoff point u ∈ S Q co satisfying u i ≥ π i b(θ) for all i ∈ N and u k > π k b(θ) for some k ∈ N . Note that u is a rational convex combination of payoff points in π( i∈N A i ). Thus, for every i-th population, a sufficiently large mutation set
} can be introduced such that the post-entry strategies satisfy the following properties.
• For each i ∈ N , the equality
13 A mixed strategy σ i for player i is rational if all values of σ i are rational numbers. A mixed-strategy profile σ is rational if all its mixed strategies are rational. 14 The value of the invasion barrierε appearing in the stability criterion in Tu and Juang (2018) is independent of any post-entry equilibrium. But the same necessary results also hold for the weaker criterion defined in this paper.
holds for every θ s i ∈ Θ i .
15
• For any θ ∈ supp(µ), any θ ∈ Θ, and any T N , we have b(
Then, for each i ∈ N and each θ s i ∈ Θ i , the difference between the average fitnesses of θ
So, for anyε ∈ (0, 1), we can find proper relations among the mutants' population shares with
for all i ∈ N and all θ s i ∈ Θ i , and the above inequality is strict for some k-th population. Thus, the configuration (µ, b) is not infinitely stable.
Remark. According to Lemma 4.3, if (µ, b) is infinitely stable and π b(θ) ∈ S Q nc , then π b(θ) ∈ P (S nc ) ∩ P (S Q co ). In particular, when N = {1, 2}, it can be shown that π b(θ) ∈ P (S Q co ) implies π b(θ) ∈ P (S co ); see Tu and Juang (2017) . Next, we focus on finding sufficient conditions for multi-mutation stability, beginning with the case N = {1, 2}. Example 4.4 indicates that in an arbitrary two-player game, a strict Nash equilibrium with the payoff vector on P (S nc ) may be stable, and that we require stronger conditions to ensure higher-order stability.
Theorem 4.7. Let (a * 1 , a * 2 ) be a strict Nash equilibrium of ({1, 2}, (
2 ) is infinitely stable. Proof. Suppose that (a * 1 , a * 2 ) is a strict Nash equilibrium of ({1, 2}, (A i ), (π i )). Let (µ, b) be a configuration where each i-th population consists of θ * i for which a * i is the strictly dominant strategy. Let J be a nonempty subset of {1, 2}. For j ∈ J and m j ∈ Z + , consider a mutation set Θ j = { θ 1 j , . . . , θ mj j } with E j = {ε 1 j , . . . , ε mj j } appearing in the j-th population. In the case where |J| = 1, it is clear that mutants have no evolutionary advantage, since (a * 1 , a * 2 ) is a strict Nash equilibrium. Let J = {1, 2}, and let b ∈ B(supp( µ E ); b). For every i ∈ {1, 2}, the post-entry average fitness of the incumbent type θ * i is
16
On the other hand, for given i ∈ {1, 2} and for each s ∈ {1, . . . , m i }, the average fitness of the mutant type θ
15 This is shown in Appendix A.
16 Here, the subscript −i on E −i , m −i , ε t −i , and b −i denotes the population index j with j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i}, and the pair (θ * i , θ t −i ) refers to the ordered pair consisting of two preference types arranged in ascending order according to their population indices. These ideas are applied to other notations in a similar way. 
To prove part (i), consider the case where m 1 = m 2 = 1. Then the claim follows directly from the fact that π(a * 1 , a * 2 ) ∈ P (S nc ). For part (ii), we first define a payoff point u ∈ S co by
2 ) > u i for some i ∈ {1, 2}. Note that the payoff point u can be written as
Therefore, we can conclude that
for every i ∈ {1, 2} and every θ s i ∈ Θ i , or
for some i ∈ {1, 2} and some θ
( µ E ; b) for some i ∈ {1, 2} and some θ s i ∈ Θ i , independently of E. Thus the configuration (µ, b) is infinitely stable, which completes the proof.
Example 4.8. Reconsider the two-player game G from Example 4.4. The strategy profile (a 11 , a 21 ) is stable, but not stable of order 2. In fact, it is not hard to see that P (S nc ) = {(7, 7), (9, 6), (6, 9)} and P (S co ) ∩ S nc = {(9, 6), (6, 9)}. Now, by Theorem 4.6 (i) and Theorem 4.7 (i), all stable strategy profiles are (a 11 , a 21 ), (a 12 , a 22 ), and (a 13 , a 23 ). Moreover, we can apply Lemma 4.3 and Theorem 4.6 to obtain that the payoff points of infinitely stable strategy profiles in this game G must be located on P (S co ) ∩ S nc . Then by Theorem 4.7 (ii), we conclude that all infinitely stable strategy profiles are (a 12 , a 22 ) and (a 13 , a 23 ).
When the number of populations is greater than or equal to three, mutants may gain evolutionary advantages, directly or indirectly, over the incumbents by various correlated deviations. This would imply that a Pareto-efficient strict Nash equilibrium may not be stable, even though every deviation will damage all deviants. The following examples of three-player games exhibit how multiple populations interact with one another to destabilize Pareto-efficient strict Nash equilibria.
17 It will provide suggestions for making a sufficient condition for stability in the most general multi-population setting.
Example 4.9. Let the fitness assignment be characterized by the following threeplayer game, and suppose that the set of actions available to each player i is {a i1 , a i2 }.
a 21 a 22 a 11 7, 7, 7 3, 1, 3 a 12 1, 3, 3 7, 7, 0 a 31 a 21 a 22 a 11 1, 3, 3 0, 0, 0 a 12 0, 0, 0 7, 7, 0 a 32
Then (a 11 , a 21 , a 31 ) is a strict Nash equilibrium which weakly Pareto dominates all other strategy profiles, and thus the payoff point of (a 11 , a 21 , a 31 ) lies on P (S co ). However, we can introduce a mutation set to destabilize this equilibrium. Let (µ, b) be a configuration with the aggregate outcome (a 11 , a 21 , a 31 ), so that b(θ) = (a 11 , a 21 , a 31 ) for all θ ∈ supp(µ). Consider three indifferent mutant types θ 1 , θ 2 , and θ 3 entering the three populations, respectively. Suppose that the focal equilibrium b satisfies the conditions: (1) b( θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 ) = (a 12 , a 22 , σ 3 ) if θ 1 = θ 1 , θ 2 = θ 2 , and θ 3 is an incumbent in supp(µ 3 ) adopting a strategy σ 3 ∈ ∆({a 31 , a 32 }); (2) otherwise b( θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 ) = (a 11 , a 21 , a 31 ).
It is easy to verify that no matter what the mutants' population shares are and no matter what the strategy σ 3 an incumbent in the third population adopts, we have Π θ1 ( µ E ; b) = Π θ1 ( µ E ; b), Π θ2 ( µ E ; b) = Π θ2 ( µ E ; b), and Π θ3 ( µ E ; b) > Π θ3 ( µ E ; b) for all incumbents θ 1 , θ 2 , and θ 3 . Thus (a 11 , a 21 , a 31 ) cannot be a stable aggregate outcome.
The above example shows that for a strict Nash equilibrium in a three-player game, there may be a correlated deviation that does not damage any one of deviants, and so the mutants could hurt the incumbents without any expense. On the other hand, in the following example, we will see how mutants have evolutionary advantages even though any deviation will incur a loss.
Example 4.10. Let the following three-player game represent the fitness assignment, and let {a i1 , a i2 } be the action set of player i for i = 1, 2, 3.
a 21 a 22 a 11 7, 7, 7 9, 6, 0 a 12 6, 0, 9 6, 0, 9 a 31 a 21 a 22 a 11 0, 9, 6 9, 6, 0 a 12 0, 9, 6 1, 1, 1 a 32
In this game, there are additional conditions imposed on the Pareto-efficient strict Nash equilibrium (a 11 , a 21 , a 31 ): the fitnesses of all deviants will be reduced for any deviation. Even so, the strategy profile (a 11 , a 21 , a 31 ) is not stable. To verify this, let (a 11 , a 21 , a 31 ) be the aggregate outcome of a configuration (µ, b). For each i, consider an indifferent mutant type θ i entering the i-th population with a population share ε i , and suppose that the adopted focal equilibrium b satisfies the conditions: for any (θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 ) ∈ supp(µ), b( θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 ) = b(θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 ) = b(θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 ) = b( θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 ) = (a 11 , a 21 , a 31 ), b 1 ( θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 ) = a 11 , b 2 ( θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 ) = a 22 , b 1 ( θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 ) = a 12 , b 3 ( θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 ) = a 31 , b 2 (θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 ) = a 21 , b 3 (θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 ) = a 32 . E ; b) for every i ∈ J and every θ s i ∈ Θ i . Thus, a * is an infinitely stable aggregate outcome.
Discussion
We study evolutionarily stable preferences against multiple mutations in the single-and multi-population settings, respectively. A mutation set rather than a single mutant type is regarded as a unit of mutation. A configuration is r-th order stable if after an r-th order mutation set is introduced, either all mutants coexist with the incumbents or there is at least one mutant type which will become extinct. As expected, the efficiency levels of stable outcomes increase as the orders of stability increase. Here we also describe specific relations between them.
In the single-population model, we show that the third order stability is equivalent to the infinite order stability if symmetric two-player games are considered. But unlike the benefit conferred by the symmetric payoff region for a symmetric game, the analogous result for the multi-population case is uncertain. In addition, the necessary condition for higher-order stability in a general n-player game is based on the additional assumption that only rational convex combinations of pure strategies are allowed.
It is worth noting that the number of players will influence how we determine the sufficient conditions for stability. In our multi-population setting, we show that if the number of populations increases, a Pareto-efficient, strictly strong Nash equilibrium can be destabilized by mutants coming from a first order mutation set. To ensure the stability for multi-population settings, we have to make sure that there exist no correlated deviations such that no matter what strategies the incumbents adopt, the average fitnesses available to mutants are at least as high as the average fitnesses of the corresponding incumbents with at least one strict inequality. The sufficient condition that we provide for more than two separate populations seems too strong. There should be alternatives which impose constraints more precisely on the behavior of mutants.
Finally, if two-player games in the single-population case are extended to n-player games, it is not hard to verify that an efficient, strictly strong Nash equilibrium is stable. Unlike in the multi-population model, such a natural extension of the sufficient condition for the first order stability can be achieved, because every mutant type a mutant can encounter is himself. However, if multiple mutations are introduced, then correlated deviations may benefit all mutants on average, and so a stable outcome may fail to exist. For example, let the fitness assignment be characterized by a symmetric three-player game as follows.
a 1 a 2 a 1 3, 3, 3 0, 0, 0 a 2 0, 0, 0 1, 1, 6 a 1 a 1 a 2 a 1 0, 0, 0 6, 1, 1 a 2 1, 6, 1 0, 0, 0 a 2 Then (a 1 , a 1 , a 1 ) is a strictly strong Nash equilibrium with the payoff vector on the Pareto frontier of the cooperative payoff region. Even so, it can be destabilized by two mutant types θ 1 and θ 2 with the following strategies: each θ i adopts a 2 if his opponents are the two distinct mutant types θ 1 and θ 2 , and adopts a 1 otherwise. Thus, when the number of players increases in the single-population setting, a higher-order stable outcome requires stronger sufficient conditions, as discussed in the multi-population case. where κ(s 1 , . . . , s n ) is an integer between 0 and r − 1 satisfying s 1 + · · · + s n ≡ κ(s 1 , . . . , s 2 ) mod r. Then for every i ∈ N and every θ 
